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Abstract
This paper examines efficient risk sharing under limited commitment and search
frictions. The model features a social planner and a continuum of risk-averse
workers, where the planner is able to provide consumption only to workers matched
with the planner and faces an aggregate resource constraint, while workers can walk
away from the match in any period and search for a new match. The formation of
new matches and the exogenous destruction of existing ones substantially expand
the set of feasible stationary allocations, providing a role for the social welfare
function. In the benchmark case of the Benthamite social welfare function, we
find that the efficient stationary allocation exhibits novel consumption dynamics:
Consumption begins at a relatively low level, converges toward a certain level when
the participation constraint is slack, and jumps up when it binds. We then explore
the role of limited commitment in generating such rich consumption dynamics.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines efficient risk sharing under limited commitment and search fric-
tions. The model involves a benevolent social planner who provides consumption to a
continuum of risk-averse workers. To provide consumption to a worker, the planner must
first employ or, equivalently, form a match with the worker through a frictional matching
process. Every period, a match yields an output that is subject to idiosyncratic shocks.
The planner must finance consumption to employed workers as well as the cost of creating
vacancies with the output from all the matches. In any period, an employed worker has
the option to leave the match with a fraction of the current output and to enter the pool
of unemployment. An employed worker also becomes unemployed when the match is
hit by an exogenous separation shock. In either case of match termination, the worker’s
past employment history is wiped out, and the worker seeks to be employed again. The
main contribution of our paper is to show that the efficient stationary allocation in such
an environment exhibits completely different consumption dynamics from the standard
limited commitment literature.
Our paper belongs to the dynamic contracting literature that examines efficient risk
sharing between a single principal and many agents. In particular, the environment
of the model builds on the work of Krueger (2000), who adopts a limited commitment
version of Atkeson and Lucas’s (1992, 1995) model of private information and examines
an efficient stationary allocation in an economy populated by a continuum of consumers
who face idiosyncratic income risk. However, while, in Krueger (2000), the relationship
between planner and consumers is automatically formed and never terminates in any
efficient allocation, in the present paper, the relationship is formed through a frictional
matching process and is subject to exogenous separation shocks, in a spirit similar to that
of the Mortensen–Pissarides model.1 This extension has two important consequences.
First, the extension enriches the contracting problem by endogenizing the agents’ value
of the outside option. In Krueger (2000), the outside option of an agent is autarky, over
which the planner has no influence. In contrast, in our paper, a worker can seek a new
match after leaving the current one and, as a result, the planner’s choice of consumption
affects, in any stationary allocation, not only the workers’ value in the current match, but
also the worker’s value of the outside option through consumption in future matches.
Second, the extension substantially enlarges the set of (incentive- and resource-) feasi-
ble stationary allocations, and consequently extends the scope of welfare analysis. That
is, when the principal–agent relationship is, as in Atkeson and Lucas (1995) and Krueger
1See, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000).
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(2000), neither destroyed exogenously nor terminated optimally by the principal, station-
arity is a rather strong requirement such that the Pareto criterion suffices to pin down the
efficient allocation.2 The situation changes dramatically once the creation and destruc-
tion of the relationship are introduced. To see the intuition, consider an allocation in
which the consumption of all agents grows at a constant positive rate in the course of the
principal–agent relationship. Clearly, such an allocation can never be stationary when
the relationship is permanent. However, that does not apply when the relationship is
continuously terminated and recreated; indeed, in our environment, any time-invariant al-
location choice of the planner is consistent with stationarity, if not incentive and resource
feasibility. Consequently, our model exhibits a continuum of Pareto-efficient feasible
stationary allocations. This enables us to discuss how efficiency depends on the social
welfare function or, equivalently, the type of social planner.
As a benchmark case, we assume a Benthamite social planner who maximizes the
sum of individual welfare or, equivalently, the expected discounted lifetime utility of all
workers in the steady state. We then examine the corresponding efficient allocation and
show that the consumption of employed workers features rich dynamics, which is novel
in the limited commitment literature. That is, consumption is relatively low for newly
employed workers. In subsequent periods, consumption moves toward a certain level until
the participation constraint binds. When the participation constraint binds, consumption
jumps up, and then evolves toward this level of consumption again.
As an extension, we consider a Rawlsian social planner who maximizes the welfare of
the least well-off workers in the steady state. We show that the consumption dynamics
differ completely from the benchmark case. This time, consumption is relatively high
for newly employed workers and then falls whenever the participation constraint is slack.
Such a downward trend in consumption resembles the consumption dynamics in Atkeson
and Lucas (1995) and Krueger (2000).
To highlight the impact of limited commitment, we then explore the consumption
dynamics under full commitment. We find that, under full commitment, the Benthamite
planner equalizes the consumption of all employed workers. In contrast, the Rawlsian
planner allows consumption to fall throughout the employment relationship. These results
indicate that limited commitment is the source of inequality among employed workers
under the Benthamite planner, while consumption inequality persists regardless of the
workers’ commitment ability under the Rawlsian planner.
In addition to the studies mentioned above, the present paper is particularly related to
2An efficient allocation is not necessarily unique in Atkeson and Lucas (1995) and Krueger (2000),
but all efficient allocations share similar qualitative features.
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two studies that endogenize outside option values in a limited commitment environment.
Krueger and Uhlig (2006) examine risk sharing when agents are able to enter a new con-
tract with competing principals after reneging on the original contract. Rudanko (2009)
explores labor market dynamics using a model that incorporates the limited commitment
environment into a competitive search model a` la Moen (1997). However, these studies
are concerned with market equilibrium and thus do not analyze efficient risk sharing under
different social welfare functions. Moreover, these studies do not impose an aggregate
resource constraint as does our paper.3
In terms of methodology, we differ substantially from the work of Krueger (2000) and
most of the dynamic contracting literature in that we do not use the recursive formulation
of the problem. This is because, in our environment, the endogenous outside option values
do not allow us to readily formulate the planner’s problem in a recursive fashion. We
resort instead to a variational argument using the sequential formulation of the problem
and obtain the conditions that characterize the efficient allocation.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Time is discrete, and there is a single perishable consumption good. The economy is
populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived workers (or agents) of mass one. Workers
have a period utility function U (c), where c ≥ 0 denotes consumption, and discount the
future with β ∈ (0, 1). The utility function U is twice continuously differentiable with
U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0.
Throughout, the analysis focuses on the stationary (or, equivalently, steady-state)
allocation. There is a benevolent social planner who aims to maximize social welfare, to
be defined in Section 2.5. The planner employs workers and provides consumption during
employment. Due to search frictions, the planner must post vacancies to employ, or to
form matches with, workers. The flow cost of posting a vacancy is k > 0. The number
of matches formed each period is M (u, v), where u is the number of unemployed workers,
and v is the number of vacancies posted by the planner. The matching function M (u, v)
is such that M (0, v) = M (u, 0) = 0, increasing4 in both arguments, concave, twice
continuously differentiable, and exhibits constant returns to scale. The probability that
3Since Krueger and Uhlig (2006) allow the principal to consume a negative amount, their feasibility
constraint has a completely distinct role from that in the present paper (or that in Atkeson and Lucas
(1995) and Krueger (2000)).
4Throughout, increasing implies strictly increasing, and decreasing implies strictly decreasing.
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each vacancy is matched with an unemployed worker is M (u, v) /v = M (θ−1, 1) ≡ q (θ),
where θ ≡ v/u is market tightness. Similarly, the probability that an unemployed worker
is matched with a vacancy is M (u, v) /u =M (1, θ) ≡ p (θ) = θq (θ).5
The flow output of a match is y ∈ Y = {y¯1, y¯2, . . . , y¯N}, y¯1 < y¯2 < . . . < y¯N ,
where y is idiosyncratic to each match. Let yt denote output in the t-th period of a
match, and yt = (y1, y2, . . . , yt) be the history of output up to the t-th period. Output yt
follows a first-order Markov process, and the initial output y1 is drawn from the stationary
distribution for yt. Below, let π (y
t) denote the unconditional probability of history yt
occurring.
Each period, the planner provides consumption to the employed worker, which may
depend on the history of output in the current match but not on past employment status.6
Thus, consumption in a match following history yt is ct (y
t) ≥ 0. While unemployed,
workers consume home production b ∈ (0, y¯1). To focus on the risk-sharing implication
of introducing search frictions, we preclude the provision of unemployment benefits.
Workers lack the ability to commit to stay in a match, such that, in any period, an
employed worker can take away a fraction of the current output, become unemployed, and
search for a new match. That is, if, in period t, a worker exits a match whose current
output is yt, the worker’s consumption in period t is
cˆ (yt) ≡ ρyt + (1− ρ) b (1)
for some constant ρ ∈ [0, 1].7 Since yt > b, cˆ (yt) ≥ b with equality if and only if ρ = 0.
Each period, with probability s ∈ (0, 1), a match is hit by a separation shock; the
match is then terminated exogenously and the worker becomes unemployed. In an effi-
cient stationary allocation described below, separation occurs only exogenously because,
given y¯1 > b, it is never optimal for the planner to terminate a match.
5In discrete time models, it sometimes becomes necessary to truncate the matching function to avoid
the probabilities p (θ) and q (θ) from exceeding one. We abstract from this issue by assuming that the
model parameters are such that the efficient allocation is the interior optimum of the planner’s problem.
6This formulation rules out the possibility of penalizing a worker who voluntarily left a previous match.
We impose this restriction because, in reality, workers are generally not penalized for quitting firms.
7In models of limited commitment, y is typically an agent’s endowment, so the natural assumption is
that the agent consumes y in the period of walking away from the principal (ρ = 1). In labor search
and matching models, it is more natural for a worker to exit the match before producing output y and
consume b (ρ = 0). The formulation here nests both these assumptions as special cases.
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2.2 Worker’s Value Functions
Let V u be the worker’s value of being unemployed, and V et (y
t) be the worker’s value
of being employed in a match with history yt. Note that V u is common to all unemployed
workers, because past employment status does not affect consumption in future matches.
Then, V u is expressed as
V u = U (b) + βp (θ) (1− s)
∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
V e1
(
y1
)
+ β [1− p (θ) (1− s)]V u. (2)
In (2), the first term is the current utility from home production. The next period,
an unemployed worker finds a match with probability p (θ) and does not face exogenous
separation with probability 1 − s. The worker then receives the value of employment
V e1 , which depends on y
1 = y1. With probability 1 − p (θ) (1− s), the worker remains
unemployed and receives V u. We can also express V u using the sequence of consumption
{ct (y
t)}
∞
t=1 as
V u = U (b) + βp (θ)
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 (1− s)t−1

(1− s)∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
))
+ sV u

 (3)
+ β (1− p (θ)) V u.
Using V u, we can express V et (y
t) as8
V et
(
yt
)
= U
(
ct
(
yt
))
+ β

(1− s) ∑
yt+1|yt
π (yt+1)
π (yt)
V et+1
(
yt+1
)
+ sV u

 , (4)
which can be iterated forward to yield
V et
(
yt
)
= U
(
ct
(
yt
))
+
∞∑
τ=1
βτ (1− s)τ
∑
yt+τ |yt
π (yt+τ )
π (yt)
U
(
ct+τ
(
yt+τ
))
+
βs
1− β (1− s)
V u.
(5)
Let us now consider the worker’s value of the outside option, V o. Upon exiting the
match, the worker consumes cˆ (yt) = ρyt + (1− ρ) b in the current period and becomes
unemployed. Thus, V o depends on the current output yt but not on the entire history
yt, and it can be expressed as
V o (yt) = U (cˆ (yt))− U (b) + V
u. (6)
8 Throughout, yt+τ |yt, τ ≥ 0, denotes any history y˜t+τ such that y˜t = yt.
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Note that V o (yt) ≥ V
u since cˆ (yt) ≥ b, and that V
o rises one to one with V u.
2.3 Excess Demand Function
For any allocation x = (θ, {ct (y
t)}
∞
t=1) ∈ D ≡ R
∞
+ ,
9 the excess demand for resources
is given by
ED = kθu−
∞∑
t=1
∑
yt
et
(
yt
) (
yt − ct
(
yt
))
. (7)
The first term on the right-hand side (RHS), kθu = kv, is the aggregate vacancy cost.
The second term is the sum of the match output net of consumption of workers. Here,
et
(
yt
)
= up (θ) (1− s)t π
(
yt
)
(8)
denotes the measure of workers employed in a match with history yt.
Stationarity requires the number of workers exiting the pool of unemployment,
up (θ) (1− s), to be equal to the number of those entering it, (1− u) s; hence
u =
s
s + p (θ) (1− s)
. (9)
2.4 Incentive Feasibility and Resource Feasibility
Let us now turn to the two constraints faced by the planner. The first is the partici-
pation constraint,
V et
(
yt
)
≥ V o (yt) , ∀y
t, (10)
which implies that at any history, the worker’s value of staying in a match must weakly
exceed the value of the outside option. The second is the resource constraint, ED ≤ 0,
or
kθu−
∞∑
t=1
∑
yt
et
(
yt
) (
yt − ct
(
yt
))
≤ 0. (11)
An allocation is incentive feasible if it satisfies the participation constraint, resource
feasible if it satisfies the resource constraint, and feasible if it is both incentive and resource
feasible. An efficient allocation is a feasible allocation that maximizes social welfare.
In the problems we consider, it can be shown that the planner uses up all available
9Throughout, x denotes an infinite dimensional allocation vector
(
θ, {ct (y
t)}
∞
t=1
)
. Similarly, x′ de-
notes an allocation vector
(
θ′, {c′t (y
t)}
∞
t=1
)
.
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resources and thus (11) holds with equality.10 Dividing the expression by θu, we obtain
k = q (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
) (
yt − ct
(
yt
))
. (12)
For later use, note that (12), p (θ) = θq (θ), and θp′ (θ) /p (θ) = 1 + θq′ (θ) /q (θ) yield
k − p′ (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
) (
yt − ct
(
yt
))
= −k
θq′ (θ)
q (θ)
. (13)
2.5 Social Welfare Function
As a benchmark case, we consider a Benthamite planner who maximizes the sum of
the welfare of all workers in the steady state. More precisely, the planner maximizes the
social welfare function
V B ≡ uV u +
∞∑
t=1
∑
yt
et
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
)
(14)
by choosing an allocation x = (θ, {ct (y
t)}
∞
t=1) subject to the participation constraint, (10),
and the resource constraint, (11). In other words, the planner maximizes V B by choosing
x ∈ D′, where D′ ⊂ D is the set of feasible allocations.11 In much of the analysis, we
resort to the following sequential form of V B, whose derivation is shown in Appendix A:
V B =
1
1− β
u

U (b) + p (θ) ∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
)) . (15)
In the next section, we discuss the properties of the Benthamite efficient allocation,
which is the constrained efficient allocation chosen by the Benthamite planner.
3 Benthamite Efficient Allocation
3.1 Efficiency Conditions
A popular approach for analyzing dynamic contracting problems is to formulate re-
cursive problems by using, for example, promised utilities or Pareto weights as state
10Lemma A2 in Appendix B, which collects lemmas that hold for general social welfare functions,
proves this result.
11Throughout, we let ⊂ denote a proper subset.
8
variables.12 However, in our environment, complications arise from the fact that the
value of the worker’s outside option is endogenous, making this approach not readily
applicable.13 Instead, our approach is to resort to a variational argument using the se-
quential formulation of the problem; we take a candidate optimal allocation and derive
conditions that must hold to rule out welfare-improving perturbations.
The discussions below require the introduction of some notations and definitions. Let
(yt, yt+1) denote the continuation history of y
t in which output in the t + 1-th period is
yt+1. Let c
b (yt) be the value of optimal consumption at y
t when V et (y
t) = V o (yt), and
let λt (y
t) be defined by
λt
(
yt
)
≡ 1/U ′
(
ct
(
yt
))
. (16)
Unless otherwise noted, cost implies the expected resource cost, evaluated using the
planner’s subjective prices. The direct cost of V et (y
t) implies the cost of providing V et (y
t)
to a single worker with history yt, taking V u as given. Similarly, the direct cost of V u
refers to the cost of providing V u to a single unemployed worker, taking V u in future
periods as given. The direct marginal cost of V et (y
t) is the increase in the direct cost
of V et (y
t) as V et (y
t) is raised by one infinitesimal unit, which ignores the indirect costs
and benefits arising from the effect of the change in V et (y
t) on V u and V eτ (y
τ ), yτ 6= yt.
The direct marginal cost of V u is defined similarly. The shadow cost of the participation
constraint at (yt, yt+1) is the additional cost required to satisfy the participation constraint
at (yt, yt+1) as this constraint is tightened by one infinitesimal unit, when there is a single
worker with history (yt, yt+1). These three types of costs are proportional to the relevant
population of workers and, therefore, for example, the descriptions above hold when “a
single worker” is replaced by “measure one of workers”. Finally, the marginal cost of V B
is the additional cost required to increase social welfare V B by one infinitesimal unit.
We are now ready to present Proposition 1, which summarizes the conditions that
characterize the Benthamite efficient allocation.14
12See, e.g., Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) and Marcet and Marimon (1994).
13Another potential approach, which is to set up the Lagrangian from the planner’s sequential
problem and to take the first-order conditions, faces two challenges. First, the sequential problem is an
infinite-dimensional problem, in which case the Lagrangian may not be expressed as a sum of an infinite
series (see Dechert (1982) and Rustichini (1998)). Second, first-order conditions are not sufficient for an
optimum, because of the non-convexity of the problem due to endogenously determined outside option
values; moreover, the infinite-dimensionality of the problem makes it difficult to show that a constraint
qualification is satisfied or, equivalently, that first-order conditions are necessary for an optimum. The
conditions obtained from this approach, however, do coincide with those in Propositions 1 and 3 below.
14The proofs of all the propositions are given in Appendix C.
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Proposition 1 The Benthamite efficient allocation exists and satisfies
λt+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
= α + βλt
(
yt
)
+ ψt+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
, (17)
λ1
(
y1
)
= α + βγ + ψ1
(
y1
)
, (18)
−ku
θq′ (θ)
q (θ)
=γuβp′ (θ) (1− s)

∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
V e1
(
y1
)
− V u


+ αup′ (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
)
− αu (1− u)
p′ (θ)
p (θ)

V u + p (θ) ∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
) , (19)
γu [(1− β) + β (1− s) p (θ)] = αu+
∞∑
t=1
∑
yt
et
(
yt
) (
βsλt
(
yt
)
− ψt
(
yt
))
. (20)
Here, α > 0 is the marginal cost of V B, while λt (y
t) > 0 and γ > 0 are the direct marginal
costs of V et (y
t) and V u, respectively, and ψt (y
t) ≥ 0, defined by
ψt+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
≡ max
{
0,
1
U ′ (cb (yt+1))
− α− βλt
(
yt
)}
, (21)
ψ1
(
y1
)
≡ max
{
0,
1
U ′ (cb (y1))
− α− βγ
}
, (22)
is the shadow cost of the participation constraint at yt, for the Benthamite planner. Fur-
ther, γ ≤ α/ (1− β), with strict inequality if there is any binding participation constraint.
Let us now explain these conditions. First, (17) can be seen as the optimality
condition for V et+1 (y
t, yt+1), given V
e
t (y
t). To see this, suppose the planner raises
V et+1 (y
t, yt+1) by one infinitesimal unit for a measure et+1 (y
t, yt+1) of workers with history
(yt, yt+1), keeping V
e
t (y
t) unchanged. Then, social welfare V B rises by et+1 (y
t, yt+1) units,
whose value in resource units is αet+1 (y
t, yt+1). Further, while the planner incurs cost
et+1 (y
t, yt+1) λt+1 (y
t, yt+1) from raising V
e
t+1 (y
t, yt+1), the rise in V
e
t+1 (y
t, yt+1) reduces the
cost of providing the same V et (y
t) as before by et (y
t)β (1− s) (πt+1 (y
t, yt+1) /πt (y
t))λt (y
t),
as can be seen from (4). When the participation constraint is slack at (yt, yt+1), such a
perturbation as well as the reverse perturbation are both incentive feasible. Thus, the
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net gain from such a perturbation must be zero, or
et+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
λt+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
= αet+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
+ et
(
yt
)
β (1− s)
πt+1 (y
t, yt+1)
πt (yt)
λt
(
yt
)
,
(23)
which agrees with the condition obtained by setting ψt+1 (y
t, yt+1) = 0 in (17). When the
participation constraint binds at (yt, yt+1), (17) and (21) yield λt+1 (y
t, yt+1) = 1/U
′
(
cb (yt+1)
)
,
consistently with V et+1 (y
t, yt+1) = V
o (yt+1). The argument for (18) is similar.
Next, (19) is the optimality condition for θ. The left-hand side (LHS) shows the
effect of a marginal increase in θ on the excess demand.15 On the RHS, the first line, as
can be observed from (2), shows the benefit of an increase in V u from the increase in θ,
taking future V u and all V e1 (y
1) as given, converted into resource units by multiplying by
γ. The second and third lines represent, as seen from (8), (9), and (14), the impact of
an increase in θ on V B, taking V u and all V et (y
t) as given, measured in resource units.
At the optimum, these effects must be equalized as in (19).
Finally, (20) is the optimality condition for V u, which ensures that, in the efficient
allocation, there is no net gain from perturbing V u. Here, the LHS shows the effect of a
marginal increase in V u on the cost of providing V u to a measure u of unemployed workers,
taking into account the effect of the change in V u in future periods on the current V u.
On the RHS, the first term is the direct impact of an increase in V u on V B, measured
in resource units. The second term shows the effects on the cost of providing V et (y
t)
and on the shadow cost of the participation constraint at yt, summed over the relevant
population of workers.
3.2 Consumption Dynamics
We now use the efficiency conditions to characterize the consumption dynamics.
Proposition 2 Let c∞ be defined by U
′ (c∞) = (1− β) /α, and assume that the partici-
pation constraint binds at some yt. In the Benthamite efficient allocation, (i) for some
c¯1 > 0, c1 (y
1) = c¯1 < c∞ for all y
1 at which the participation constraint is slack, (ii) if the
participation constraint is slack at (yt, yt+1), then 1/U
′ (ct+1 (y
t, yt+1)) = α+β/U
′ (ct (y
t))
such that ct+1 (y
t, yt+1) ∈ (ct (y
t) , c∞) for ct (y
t) < c∞ and ct+1 (y
t, yt+1) ∈ (c∞, ct (y
t)) for
ct (y
t) > c∞, and (iii) there is at least one y¯n ∈ Y such that c
b (y¯n) > c∞.
15To see this, differentiate (7) with respect to θ, taking {ct (y
t)}
∞
t=1 as given. The terms capturing the
effects of the change in θ on the excess demand, which work through the change in u, cancel out given
(12). Using (13), we obtain the LHS of (19).
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Let us explain Proposition 2. First, for all y1 at which the participation constraint
is slack, initial consumption equals some c¯1, which is a relatively low value. Second,
whenever the participation constraint is slack, consumption converges toward some c∞;
thus, consumption rises if it was previously below c∞, and falls otherwise. Third, when
the participation constraint binds, consumption jumps up; moreover, there exists at least
one output realization such that the resulting consumption exceeds c∞. Following such
output realization, consumption remains above c∞ throughout the employment spell.
As shown above, the Benthamite efficient allocation exhibits rich consumption dy-
namics, which, to the best of our knowledge, is a novel result in the limited commitment
literature. In particular, the increasing consumption profile at the early stages of a
match contrasts with the downward drift in consumption observed in Krueger (2000).
This difference arises because, in our environment, the workers’ outside option values are
endogenous, which generates benefits from relaxing the participation constraint by low-
ering c¯1 and thus V
u. We discuss in more detail the impact of limited commitment on
consumption dynamics in Section 4.3.
4 Discussion
4.1 Rawlsian Efficient Allocation
As an extension, we now consider the Rawlsian efficient allocation chosen by the
Rawlsian planner, who maximizes the welfare of the least well-off agents based on the
difference principle (Rawls, 1971). Then, the social welfare function is
V R ≡ V u, (24)
since the participation constraint (10) and V o (yt) ≥ V
u imply that unemployed workers
are the least well off.16 As in the baseline case, we often use the sequential form of
V R = V u, given by (3) or the expression below, whose derivation is given in Appendix A:
V R = V u =
1
(1− β)
[
1 + βp(θ)(1−s)
1−β+βs
]

U (b) + p (θ) ∞∑
t=1
βt (1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
)) .
(25)
16Our mathematical formulation of the Rawlsian efficient allocation has some similarities with that of
Grout (1977), who proposes a Rawlsian intertemporal consumption rule in an overlapping-generations
framework. Under this rule, each generation maximizes utility subject to the constraint that all sub-
sequent generations are at least as well off as the current generation, which amounts to maximizing the
minimum of the utility of current and future generations.
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Besides Rawlsian ethics, this social welfare function is also motivated by the approach
from the search and matching literature; in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model,
the efficient allocation is usually assumed to be the allocation that maximizes the dis-
counted present value of the aggregate output net of vacancy costs, which turns out to
also maximize the value of unemployed workers.17
Proposition 3 summarizes the efficiency conditions in this case.
Proposition 3 The Rawlsian efficient allocation exists and satisfies
λt+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
= βλt
(
yt
)
+ ψt+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
, (26)
λ1
(
y1
)
= βγ + ψ1
(
y1
)
, (27)
−ku
θq′ (θ)
q (θ)
= γuβp′ (θ) (1− s)

∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
V e1
(
y1
)
− V u

 . (28)
Here, λt (y
t) > 0 and γ > 0 are the direct marginal costs of V et (y
t) and V u, respectively,
and ψt (y
t) ≥ 0, defined by
ψt+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
≡ max
{
0,
1
U ′ (cb (yt+1))
− βλt
(
yt
)}
, (29)
ψ1
(
y1
)
≡ max
{
0,
1
U ′ (cb (y1))
− βγ
}
, (30)
is the shadow cost of the participation constraint at yt, for the Rawlsian planner.
Let us again explain these conditions. As for (17), (26) can be understood as the
optimality condition for V et+1 (y
t, yt+1), given V
e
t (y
t). Unlike in the benchmark case,
however, if V et+1 (y
t, yt+1) is increased by one infinitesimal unit for all workers with history
(yt, yt+1) while V
e
t (y
t) is kept unchanged, there is no direct impact on social welfare V R.
Thus, the condition corresponding to (23) is
et+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
λt+1
(
yt, yt+1
)
= et
(
yt
)
β (1− s)
πt+1 (y
t, yt+1)
πt (yt)
λt
(
yt
)
, (31)
which agrees with the condition obtained by setting ψt+1 (y
t, yt+1) = 0 in (26). The
argument for (27) is similar.
17See Pissarides (2000), Chapter 4. There is yet another interpretation for this social welfare function.
It is straightforward to introduce entry and exit by assuming that workers die with a constant probability
and are replaced by new-born workers who enter the labor market as unemployed workers. In such an
extended model, maximizing V u is equivalent to maximizing the ex ante welfare of new-born workers.
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Finally, (28) is the optimality condition for θ. Note that in (28), the terms that
appear on the second and third lines on the RHS of (19) are absent because, this time,
an increase in θ has no direct impact on V R.18
Proposition 4 describes the consumption dynamics in the Rawlsian efficient allocation.
Proposition 4 In the Rawlsian efficient allocation, (i) for some c˜1 > 0, c1 (y
1) = c˜1
for all y1 at which the participation constraint is slack, (ii) if the participation con-
straint is slack at (yt, yt+1), then U
′ (ct (y
t)) = βU ′ (ct+1 (y
t, yt+1)) such that ct (y
t) >
ct+1 (y
t, yt+1), and (iii) if the participation constraint binds at (y
t, yt+1), then U
′ (ct (y
t)) >
βU ′ (ct+1 (y
t, yt+1)).
In the Rawlsian efficient allocation, c1 (y
1) is equalized across all y1 at which the
participation constraint is slack, just as for the benchmark Benthamite case. Unlike the
benchmark case, however, consumption is relatively high at the beginning of the match
and falls in subsequent periods whenever the participation constraint is slack. Such
consumption dynamics are similar to those in Krueger (2000), which implies that in the
Rawlsian case, the fact that the workers’ outside option values are endogenous does not
qualitatively affect the consumption profile. We explain the reason in Section 4.3.
4.2 Examples: Constant Relative Risk Aversion Utility and
Two Values of Output
To illustrate the consumption dynamics in the Benthamite and Rawlsian efficient al-
locations, Figures 1 and 2 plot the typical paths of (logged) consumption in a match,
assuming U (c) = c1−σ/ (1− σ), σ > 0, and two values for match output, y1 and y2.
19
In the Benthamite efficient allocation, 1/U ′ (ct+1 (y
t, yt+1)) = α + β/U
′ (ct (y
t)) in
Proposition 2(ii) yields
ct+1 (y
t, yt+1)
ct (yt)
=
[
α
1
(ct (yt))
1
σ
+ β
] 1
σ
. (32)
Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the consumption growth rate when the participation con-
straint is slack is decreasing in the previous consumption and is positive (negative) when
consumption is previously below (above) c∞ = [α/ (1− β)]
1
σ .
18The counterpart to (20) exists also for the Rawlsian efficient allocation. However, this time, the
condition is not necessary to pin down the efficient allocation; rather, it determines the value of α, given
the efficient allocation.
19In Figures 1 and 2, “PC” refers to the participation constraint.
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In the Rawlsian efficient allocation, U ′ (ct (y
t)) = βU ′ (ct+1 (y
t, yt+1)) in Proposition
4(ii) yields
ct+1 (y
t, yt+1)
ct (yt)
= β
1
σ < 1. (33)
Thus, consumption grows at a constant negative rate β
1
σ − 1 when the participation
constraint is slack, which corresponds to downward sloping line segments in Figure 2.
4.3 Limited Commitment and the Drift in Consumption
To highlight the impact of limited commitment on consumption dynamics, we now
consider the situation in which workers are able to fully commit to stay in a match except
in the case of exogenous separation.
Let us begin with the benchmark Benthamite case. Substituting (17) and (18) into
(20) yields
γ +
p (θ)
1− β (1− s) (1− p (θ))
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
ψt
(
yt
)
=
α
1− β
. (34)
Under full commitment, ψt (y
t) = 0 for all yt. Thus, (34) implies γ = α/ (1− β); but
then, (17) and (18) imply λt (y
t) = α/ (1− β) for all yt, such that ct (y
t) is the same
for all yt.20 The intuition is straightforward: if there is no commitment problem, the
Benthamite planner simply equates the marginal utility of consumption of all employed
workers, which implies a flat consumption path for each worker.
A typical result in the one-sided limited commitment literature is that whenever the
agent’s participation constraint is slack, the agent’s marginal utility of consumption grows
at a constant rate.21 Since this growth rate is determined solely by the relative size of
the discount factor of the principal and the agent, it applies also under full commitment.
Our results above indicate that such a typical result in the literature no longer applies
in our environment. That is, in the Benthamite case, limited commitment generates
the drift in consumption when the participation constraint is slack, not just the jump in
consumption when the participation constraint binds.
Let us now consider what happens in the Rawlsian case under full commitment.22
20While this ct (y
t) satisfies U ′ (ct (y
t)) = (1− β) /α, in general, it does not equal c∞ in the limited
commitment case, since α is an endogenous variable.
21See, e.g., Krueger and Uhlig (2006). When the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion
in consumption, this implies a constant consumption growth rate.
22Under full commitment, calling a planner who maximizes V R = V u as Rawlsian is somewhat mis-
leading because, in the absence of the participation constraint, the unemployed workers need not be the
least well-off agents. This observation, however, is inessential to our argument that limited commitment
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This time, if ψt (y
t) = 0 for all yt, then (26) and (27) imply λt (y
t) = βtγ for all yt. Thus,
consumption is common across y1 and then falls over time, such that the marginal utility
of consumption grows at rate β−1 − 1 < 0. Such a fall in consumption is the same as
when the participation constraint is slack under limited commitment. Therefore, in the
Rawlsian case, limited commitment plays no role in generating the drift in consumption;
the planner chooses to front-load the consumption of workers because, given that workers
discount the future, this is the least costly way to provide a given level of utility.
It is worthwhile explaining why limited commitment generates the drift in consumption
in the Benthamite case but not in the Rawlsian case. The difference arises because, under
limited commitment, the Benthamite planner has an incentive to lower V u relative to the
full commitment case; this is achieved by lowering V e1 (y
1) and, therefore, c1 (y
1) for y1 at
which the participation constraint is slack. The resulting relaxation of the participation
constraint improves efficiency and raises V B. The Rawlsian planner, however, does not
reap the benefit of lowering V u to relax the participation constraint, since the objective
function V R is V u itself.
We conclude this section by noting that the consumption dynamics described above
also have implications on inequality among employed workers. Under the Benthamite
planner, consumption inequality arises precisely because of limited commitment. It is
easily observed that such inequality in consumption translates into inequality in welfare.
In contrast, somewhat paradoxically, inequalities in consumption and welfare exist under
the Rawlsian planner irrespective of the presence of the commitment problem.
4.4 Decentralization
Krueger (2000) discusses how, through an argument similar to that of Atkeson and
Lucas (1992, 1995), the efficient allocation under limited commitment can be decentralized
as an equilibrium. The idea is to consider financial intermediaries who compete in
providing long-term insurance contracts to clients. These financial intermediaries freely
borrow or lend the consumption good with other intermediaries at a gross interest rate
R, and R adjusts to clear this consumption loan market.
We now explore the possibility of extending the argument above to decentralize the
efficient allocation in our environment. Consider the following market economy. Finan-
cial intermediaries freely trade the good with other intermediaries at a gross interest rate
R, and post vacancies in the labor market by paying the flow cost k per vacancy. When
a financial intermediary and a worker are matched and are not immediately hit by an
exogenous separation shock, they negotiate, before the realization of y1, on the worker’s
is not the source of the declining consumption path in the Rawlsian efficient allocation.
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expected value of being newly employed, V¯ e1 . The value of V¯
e
1 is determined according
to Nash bargaining, where η ∈ (0, 1) is the worker’s bargaining power. During the entire
course of the match, the financial intermediary receives output and provides consumption
to the worker in a way consistent with V¯ e1 . In any period, the worker can walk away
from the match with a fraction of the current output and become unemployed with a
blank employment history, just as in the planner’s problem. In equilibrium, the expected
profit from posting a vacancy is zero, and R equals the value that clears the consumption
loan market. This setup can be considered a hybrid of the setups of Krueger (2000) and
Rudanko (2009).23
Note that for any R > (1− s)−1,24 the financial intermediary’s optimal contracting
problem, which is to maximize the expected profit from a contract, given initial output
y1 and the value promised to the worker V1 (y
1), can be analyzed using the standard
recursive approach. In particular, the worker’s marginal utility of consumption grows
at rate (βR)−1 − 1 whenever the participation constraint is slack. Clearly, no value of
R generates the rich consumption dynamics of the Benthamite case, so the Benthamite
efficient allocation cannot be obtained as an equilibrium of this market economy.
Decentralization of the Rawlsian efficient allocation appears more promising, given its
simple consumption dynamics. This turns out to be the case, as shown below.
Proposition 5 If the Rawlsian efficient allocation satisfies −θq′ (θ) /q (θ) = η, it can be
supported as an equilibrium of the market economy described above; in this equilibrium,
the gross interest rate R = 1.
The condition −θq′ (θ) /q (θ) = η in Proposition 5 is the Hosios (1990) condition,
which ensures the efficiency of equilibrium in a wide range of Mortensen–Pissarides-type
models.25 This condition turns out to play a critical role in the decentralization of the
efficient allocation in our environment as well.
23Rudanko (2009) presents a directed search model in which financial intermediaries post long-term con-
tracts and shows that, under the Hosios (1990) condition, the model is equivalent to a random matching
model in which the worker’s expected value of being newly employed is determined by Nash bargaining.
If we fix R and do not require market clearing in the consumption loan market, the market economy
described here becomes similar to that of Rudanko (2009). It may thus be possible to decentralize the
efficient allocation in our environment using the directed search framework, but here we present a model
with random matching and Nash bargaining, which is easier to describe.
24When there is no exogenous destruction of the principal–agent relationship, as in Krueger (2000),
R > 1 is necessary to make the problem well defined. Note that since goods are perishable, negative
interest rates (R < 1) are not inconsistent with equilibrium; Huggett (1993)’s model of self-insurance,
which features a similar consumption loan market as the one here, exhibits negative interest rates under
some parameters.
25As is well known, with a Cobb–Douglas matching function M (u, v) = µuκv1−κ, this condition
becomes κ = η, which is independent of θ.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine efficient risk sharing in an environment featuring lim-
ited commitment and search frictions. Introducing the creation and destruction of the
principal–agent relationship drastically changes the model’s properties, and enables richer
welfare analysis by providing room to introduce various social welfare functions. Most
notably, we find striking consumption dynamics in the Benthamite case, summarized as
follows.
Consumption in a match is initially low and then rises toward a certain level, c∞, until
the participation constraint binds for the first time. When the participation constraint
binds, consumption jumps up; the resulting consumption level may exceed c∞, in which
case consumption subsequently falls toward c∞ so long as the participation constraint is
slack. After a sufficiently long employment spell, consumption exceeds c∞ with probability
one. Such a consumption dynamics contrasts starkly with the dynamics observed in
Krueger (2000) and Atkeson and Lucas (1995).
While we introduce search frictions into a model of limited commitment, it would
also be interesting to introduce search frictions into a model of private information. A
variant of the variational approach adopted in this paper could also be useful in such an
environment. We leave such analyses to future research.
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Figure 1: Consumption path under the Benthamite planner
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Figure 2: Consumption path under the Rawlsian planner
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Appendix A: Sequential Forms of V B and V R
Appendix A derives the sequential expressions for V B and V R, given by (15) and (25),
respectively.
To obtain (15), note from (2) and (4) that
V u + p (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
)
= U (b) + βp (θ) (1− s)
∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
V e1
(
y1
)
+ β [1− p (θ) (1− s)]V u
+ p (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)U (ct (yt))+ β (1− s) ∑
yt+1|yt
π (yt+1)
π (yt)
V et+1
(
yt+1
)
+ βsV u


= U (b) + p (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
))
+ βp (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
)
+ β [1− p (θ) (1− s)]V u + βp (θ) (1− s) V u.
Rearranging and dividing by 1− β, we obtain
V u + p (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
)
=
1
1− β

U (b) + p (θ) ∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
)) , (35)
which yields (15).
To obtain (25), rearrange (3) as
[
1 +
βp (θ) (1− s)
1− β + βs
]
(1− β)V u = U (b) + p (θ)
∞∑
t=1
βt (1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
))
. (36)
Then, (25) follows immediately from (36).
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Appendix B: Lemmas Relevant for Both Cases
Appendix B collects lemmas that hold for the benchmark Benthamite efficient alloca-
tion, as well as for the Rawlsian efficient allocation discussed in Section 4. These lemmas
will be used in the proofs of the propositions in Appendix C.
In what follows, let dct (y
t) denote an infinitesimal perturbation in ct (y
t) and similarly
for dθ. Further, let dD : D × D → R+ be the distance function on D, where, for any
x, x′ ∈ D,
dD (x, x
′) = max
{
|θ − θ′| , sup
yt
∥∥ct (yt)− c′t (yt)∥∥
}
. (37)
Then, from (5), (7), (15), and (25), clearly ED, V et (y
t), V B, and V R = V u are continuous
functions from a metric space (D, dD) to R. Thus, the changes in these variables from
an infinitesimal perturbation, denoted, for example, as d (ED), are also infinitesimal.
Lemma A1 confirms a standard result in the literature.26
Lemma A1 Let {Rt (y
t)}
∞
t=1 be the sequence of history-contingent intertemporal relative
prices, and recursively define R˜t+1 (y
t, yt+1) = R˜t (y
t)Rt (y
t), where, for all y1, R˜1 (y
1) =
R for some R > (1− s)−1. Consider a component planner who takes V u and {Rt (y
t)}
∞
t=1
as given and chooses {ct+τ (y
t+τ)}
∞
τ=0 to minimize the expected resource cost Q (V
e
t (y
t) ; yt) =∑∞
τ=0 (1− s)
τ ∑
yt+τ |yt
R˜t(yt)
R˜t+τ (yt+τ )
π(yt+τ)
π(yt)
ct+τ (y
t+τ ) of providing V et (y
t) to a single worker
with history yt. Then, for any yt, Q (V et (y
t) ; yt) is increasing and strictly convex in
V et (y
t) and, if {ct+τ (y
t+τ )}
∞
τ=0 achieves Q (V
e
t (y
t) ; yt), Q′ (V et (y
t) ; yt) = 1/U ′ (ct (y
t)).
Proof. Take any yt. That Q (V et (y
t) ; yt) is increasing in V et (y
t) is immediate. To
show that Q
(
Vˆ et (y
t) ; yt
)
is strictly convex in V et (y
t), suppose {ct+τ (y
t+τ )}
∞
τ=0 achieves
Q (V et (y
t) ; yt), and {cˆt+τ (y
t+τ )}
∞
τ=0 achieves Q
(
Vˆ et (y
t) ; yt
)
. Noting (5), the participa-
tion constraint implies that, at any yt+τ ,
∞∑
τ ′=0
[β (1− s)]τ
′
∑
yt+τ+τ ′ |yt+τ
π
(
yt+τ+τ
′
)
π (yt+τ )
U
(
ct+τ+τ ′
(
yt+τ+τ
′
))
+
βs
1− β (1− s)
V u ≥ V o (yt+τ ) ,
(38)
∞∑
τ ′=0
[β (1− s)]τ
′
∑
yt+τ+τ ′ |yt+τ
π
(
yt+τ+τ
′
)
π (yt+τ )
U
(
cˆt+τ+τ ′
(
yt+τ+τ
′
))
+
βs
1− β (1− s)
V u ≥ V o (yt+τ ) ,
(39)
26Below, we suppress the dependence of Q on V u and {Rt (y
t)}
∞
t=1 to avoid notational clutter.
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where V u and thus also V o (yt+τ ) are given.
Now, take any λ ∈ (0, 1), and let V λ,et (y
t) ≡ (1− λ) V et (y
t)+λVˆ et (y
t) and cλt+τ (y
t+τ ) ≡
(1− λ) ct+τ (y
t+τ )+λcˆt+τ (y
t+τ ). From the strict concavity of U ,
{
cλt+τ (y
t+τ )
}∞
τ=0
provides
the worker strictly greater value than V λ,et (y
t); further, from (38) and (39),
∞∑
τ ′=0
[β (1− s)]τ
′
∑
yt+τ+τ ′ |yt+τ
π
(
yt+τ+τ
′
)
π (yt+τ )
U
(
cλt+τ+τ ′
(
yt+τ+τ
′
))
+
βs
1− β (1− s)
V u > V o (yt+τ ) ,
(40)
which implies that
{
cλt+τ (y
t+τ)
}∞
τ=0
makes the participation constraint slack at any yt+τ .
Thus, the planner can provide V λ,et (y
t) with fewer resources than
{
cλt+τ (y
t+τ )
}∞
τ=0
, which
implies
Q
(
V λ,et
(
yt
)
; yt
)
<
∞∑
τ=0
(1− s)τ
∑
yt+τ |yt
R˜t (y
t)
R˜t+τ (yt+τ )
π (yt+τ )
π (yt)
cλt+τ
(
yt+τ
)
= (1− λ)Q
(
V et
(
yt
)
; yt
)
+ λQ
(
Vˆ et
(
yt
)
; yt
)
,
where the equality follows from the definitions of {ct+τ (y
t+τ)}
∞
τ=0, {cˆt+τ (y
t+τ)}
∞
τ=0, and{
cλt+τ (y
t+τ )
}∞
τ=0
. Therefore, Q is strictly convex.
To show that Q′ (V et (y
t) ; yt) = 1/U ′ (ct (y
t)),27 take ǫ > 0 sufficiently small such that
there exist c−,c+ ∈ (0,∞) satisfying U (c−) = U (ct (y
t))− ǫ and U (c+) = U (ct (y
t)) + ǫ.
Then, {c−, ct+τ (y
t+τ )}
∞
τ=1 is an incentive-feasible but not necessarily optimal allocation
that provides V et (y
t)− ǫ, while {c+, ct+τ (y
t+τ )}
∞
τ=1 is an incentive-feasible but not neces-
sarily optimal allocation that provides V et (y
t) + ǫ, and thus
Q
(
V et
(
yt
)
+ ǫ; yt
)
−Q
(
V et
(
yt
)
; yt
)
≤ c+ − ct
(
yt
)
, (41)
Q
(
V et
(
yt
)
; yt
)
−Q
(
V et
(
yt
)
− ǫ; yt
)
≥ ct
(
yt
)
− c−. (42)
Further, Q (V et (y
t) ; yt) < (1/2)Q (V et (y
t)− ǫ; yt)+(1/2)Q (V et (y
t) + ǫ; yt) from the strict
convexity of Q, and thus
Q (V et (y
t) + ǫ; yt)−Q (V et (y
t) ; yt)
ǫ
>
Q (V et (y
t) ; yt)−Q (V et (y
t)− ǫ; yt)
ǫ
. (43)
27This part of the proof builds on the argument in Oyama (2013).
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From (41)–(43),
c+ − ct (y
t)
ǫ
≥
Q (V et (y
t) + ǫ; yt)−Q (V et (y
t) ; yt)
ǫ
>
Q (V et (y
t) ; yt)−Q (V et (y
t)− ǫ; yt)
ǫ
≥
ct (y
t)− c−
ǫ
.
Noting dc−/dǫ = −1/U
′ (c−) and dc+/dǫ = 1/U
′ (c+) and invoking the l’Hopital’s rule,
limǫ→0 (c+ − ct (y
t)) /ǫ = limǫ→0 (dc+/dǫ) = 1/U
′ (ct (y
t)), and limǫ→0 (ct (y
t)− c−) /ǫ =
− limǫ→0 (dc−/dǫ) = 1/U
′ (ct (y
t)). The squeeze theorem thus implies Q is differentiable
at V et (y
t) and Q′ (V et (y
t) ; yt) = 1/U ′ (ct (y
t)) and, since this result holds for any V et (y
t),
the claim follows.
Lemma A2 states that the resource constraint always binds in the planner’s problems
we analyze. This result is not obvious, since distributing extra resources may, by raising
the outside option values, lead to the violation of the participation constraints. As proved
below, however, there are always incentive-feasible ways to distribute extra resources.
Lemma A2 In both the Benthamite and Rawlsian efficient allocations, ED = 0.
Proof. Suppose ED < 0 for an efficient allocation x. Perturb x by dct (y
t) =
∆/U ′ (ct (y
t)) > 0 for all yt. Clearly, the perturbed allocation satisfies the resource
constraint since dct (y
t) is infinitesimal and, for all yt, raises V et (y
t) by an equal amount,
which we denote by dV e. Thus, from (2) and (4),
dV u = βp (θ) (1− s) dV e + β [1− p (θ) (1− s)] dV u, (44)
dV e = ∆+ β (1− s) dV e + βsdV u. (45)
Subtracting (44) from (45), we obtain
dV e − dV u = ∆+ β (1− s) (1− p (θ)) (dV e − dV u)
=
1
1− β (1− s) (1− p (θ))
∆
> 0
hence, dV e > dV u. Therefore, the perturbation raises, for all yt, V et (y
t) by more than V u
(and thus V o); hence, it does not violate any participation constraint. Further, since the
perturbation raises consumption for all employed workers without altering θ, it increases
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the value of any social welfare function that respects the Pareto principle, including V B
and V R. This contradicts the fact that x is an efficient allocation, so ED = 0.
An immediate corollary of Lemma A2 is that if x is the Benthamite (Rawlsian) efficient
allocation, then there cannot be a feasible allocation x′ that achieves the same V B (V R) as
x with ED < 0. Such an x′ would also be an efficient allocation, contradicting Lemma A2.
Lemma A3 states how, given an incentive-feasible allocation, a new incentive-feasible
allocation can be obtained by perturbing consumption at some history yτ and (yτ , yτ+1).
Lemma A3 Let x be an incentive-feasible allocation. Take any history yτ and (yτ , yτ+1),
and perturb x by (dcτ (y
τ) , dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)), keeping V
u unchanged. In the perturbed
allocation, the participation constraint holds at all histories, except possibly at (yτ , yτ+1);
further, if the participation constraint is initially slack at (yτ , yτ+1), or if dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) >
0, the participation constraint holds at all histories.
Proof. Let x and (dcτ (y
τ) , dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)) be as specified. Then, from (3),
0 = dV u
= p (θ) [βτ (1− s)τ π (yτ)U ′ (cτ (y
τ)) dcτ (y
τ) (46)
+βτ+1 (1− s)τ+1 π (yτ , yτ+1)U
′ (cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)) dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)
]
and thus dcτ (y
τ) and dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) satisfy
dcτ (y
τ) = −β (1− s)
π (yτ , yτ+1)
π (yτ )
U ′ (cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1))
U ′ (cτ (yτ ))
dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) . (47)
Since V u is unchanged in the perturbed allocation, (6) implies that neither is V o (yt)
for any yt ∈ Y . Let us now consider how the perturbation affects V
e
t (y
t) for different
yt. First, from (5) and (47), V eτ (y
τ) is unchanged so the participation constraint still
holds at yτ , and the same applies to any history preceding yτ . Next, this perturbation
raises V eτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) by U
′ (cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)) dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1), whose sign coincides with that
of dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1). Thus, if dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) > 0, the participation constraint still holds at
(yτ , yτ+1). In contrast, if dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)< 0, the participation constraint can be violated
at (yτ , yτ+1); however, if the participation constraint is initially slack at (y
τ , yτ+1), then
it remains thus for infinitesimal dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1). Finally, at all other history y
t, V et (y
t)
remains constant given that V u is unchanged, so the participation constraint continues
to hold.
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Appendix C: Proofs of Propositions
Appendix C provides the proofs of all the propositions.
Proof of Proposition1
The proof proceeds through a series of lemmas. For now, we take as given the existence
of the Benthamite efficient allocation and provide its proof in Lemma A9.
Lemma A4 characterizes the efficient consumption path when the participation con-
straint is slack.
Lemma A4 In the Benthamite efficient allocation, for any history yτ and (yτ , yτ+1)
such that the participation constraint is slack at (yτ , yτ+1), 1/U
′ (cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)) = α +
β/U ′ (cτ (y
τ)), where α > 0 is the marginal cost of V B.
Proof. Let x be the Benthamite efficient allocation. Take any (yτ , yτ+1) at which
the participation constraint is slack, and perturb x by (dcτ (y
τ) , dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)) while
satisfying (47) or, equivalently, keeping V u unchanged. Then, from Lemma A3, the
perturbed allocation is incentive feasible.
From (7), (15), and (47), we obtain
d (ED) =
(
1− β
U ′ (cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1))
U ′ (cτ (yτ))
)
eτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) , (48)
dV B = U ′ (cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)) eτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) . (49)
Dividing (48) by (49) reveals that the planner’s marginal cost of increasing V B through
this particular perturbation is
αˆ (yτ , yτ+1) ≡
1
U ′ (cτ+1 (yτ , yτ+1))
− β
1
U ′ (cτ (yτ))
. (50)
Let α > 0 be the marginal cost of V B. Clearly αˆ (yτ , yτ+1) ≥ α, because, in in-
creasing V B, the planner can do no worse than the perturbation above. Further, if
αˆ (yτ , yτ+1) > α, then the marginal cost reduction from decreasing V
B through the reverse
perturbation (−dcτ (y
τ) ,−dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)) exceeds α. Then, combining the perturbation
(−dcτ (y
τ) ,−dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)) and the perturbation that increases V
B with marginal cost
α yields a feasible allocation that achieves the same V B as x with ED < 0. This
contradicts the fact that x is the Benthamite efficient allocation, so αˆ (yτ , yτ+1) = α and
1
U ′ (cτ+1 (yτ , yτ+1))
= α + β
1
U ′ (cτ (yτ ))
, (51)
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as was to be shown.
Lemma A5 provides the economic interpretation of λt (y
t).
Lemma A5 The direct marginal cost of V et (y
t) for the Benthamite planner is increasing
in V et (y
t) and equals λt (y
t) = 1/U ′ (ct (y
t)).
Proof. Recall the component planner in Lemma A1, who takes V u and {Rt (y
t)}
∞
t=1 as
given and minimizes the expected resource cost of providing V et (y
t) to a single worker
with history yt. The first-order conditions imply that such a component planner sets
U ′ (ct (y
t)) = βRt (y
t)U ′ (ct+1 (y
t, yt+1)) when the participation constraint is slack at
(yt, yt+1), and V
e
t+1 (y
t, yt+1) = V
o (yt+1) otherwise. This result and Lemma A4 imply that
the consumption profile chosen by the Benthamite planner to provide {V et (y
t)}
∞
t=1, given
V u, will also be chosen by relevant component planners who faceRt (y
t) = αU ′ (ct (y
t)) /β+
1 for all yt. This, in turn, implies that the Benthamite planner values any {ct (y
t)}
∞
t=1 using
prices {Rt (y
t)}
∞
t=1, where Rt (y
t) = αU ′ (ct (y
t)) /β+1 for all yt. By definition, the direct
cost of V et (y
t) for the Benthamite planner is the minimized expected value, computed
using such {Rt (y
t)}
∞
t=1 and taking V
u as given, of the consumption profile that provides
V et (y
t) to a single worker with history yt; thus, it coincides with cost Q (V et (y
t) ; yt) for
the component planner who faces the same {Rt (y
t)}
∞
t=1. The claim thus follows from
Lemma A1.
The proof above reveals that the Benthamite planner’s expected resource cost of pro-
viding any V et (y
t), taking V u as given, to M workers is simply M times that for a single
worker. Thus, as a normalization, we consider a single worker (or a measure one of
workers) in defining the direct cost and direct marginal cost of V et (y
t).
Lemma A6 confirms the standard result in the limited commitment literature, namely,
that a binding participation constraint raises consumption. Lemma A6 also shows that
initial consumption is equalized across states in which the participation constraint is slack.
Lemma A6 In the Benthamite efficient allocation, (i) for any history (yτ , yτ+1) and
(yτ , yˆτ+1) such that the participation constraint is slack at (y
τ , yτ+1) and binds at (y
τ , yˆτ+1),
cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) < cτ+1 (y
τ , yˆτ+1) and (ii) for any history y
1 and yˆ1 such that the partic-
ipation constraint is slack at y1 and binds at yˆ1, c1 (y
1) = c¯1 < c1 (yˆ
1), where c¯1 > 0
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satisfies
− ku
θq′ (θ)
q (θ)
=
1
β
(
1
U ′ (c¯1)
− α
)
uβp′ (θ) (1− s)

∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
V e1
(
y1
)
− V u

 (52)
+ αup′ (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
)
− αu (1− u)
p′ (θ)
p (θ)

V u + p (θ) ∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
) .
Proof. Let x be the Benthamite efficient allocation. To prove that consumption is
greater under a binding participation constraint ((i) and the inequality part of (ii)), note
that when the participation constraint binds at yt, the planner sets V et (y
t) = V o (yt),
which exceeds the value chosen in the absence of a binding participation constraint. The
proof is then immediate from Lemma A5.
To prove that consumption is equalized across y1 at which the participation constraint
is slack (the part c1 (y
1) = c¯1 of (ii)), take any y
1 and yˆ1 at which the participation
constraint is slack, and perturb x by (dc1 (y
1) , dc1 (yˆ
1)), keeping V u unchanged. Clearly,
the perturbed allocation is incentive feasible. From (3), (8), and dV u = 0, we obtain
−e1
(
y1
)
U ′
(
c1
(
y1
))
dc1
(
y1
)
= e1
(
yˆ1
)
U ′
(
c1
(
yˆ1
))
dc1
(
yˆ1
)
, (53)
which implies dV B = 0 from (15). On the other hand, (7) and (53) imply
d (ED) = e1
(
y1
)
dc1
(
y1
)
+ e1
(
yˆ1
)
dc1
(
yˆ1
)
= e1
(
y1
)(
1−
U ′ (c1 (y
1))
U ′ (c1 (yˆ1))
)
dc1
(
y1
)
. (54)
Note from (54) that unless c1 (y
1) = c1 (yˆ
1), dc1 (y
1) can be set positive or negative to
yield d (ED) < 0, resulting in a feasible allocation that achieves the same V B as x with
ED < 0. This contradicts the fact that x is the Benthamite efficient allocation, hence,
c1 (y
1) = c1 (yˆ
1) = c¯1 for some c¯1.
To prove that c¯1 satisfies (52), take any y
1 = y1 = y¯m and (y
1, y2) at which the
participation constraint is slack28, and perturb x by (dc1 (y
1) , dc2 (y
1, y2) , dθ), keeping
V u and ED unchanged. Clearly, the perturbed allocation is feasible for infinitesimal
28If the participation constraint is slack at some y1 = y1 = y¯m, it is again slack at some
(
y1, y2
)
, as
explained below. As we show in Lemma A7 below, U ′
(
c1
(
y1
))
≥ (1− β) /α. Thus, given Lemma
A4, c2
(
y1, y2
)
≥ c1
(
y1
)
for
(
y1, y2
)
at which the participation constraint is slack. Therefore, the
participation constraint is slack, for example, at
(
y1, y2
)
= (y¯m, y¯m).
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(dc1 (y
1) , dc2 (y
1, y2) , dθ), so the efficiency of x requires the change in V
B to be zero.
The proof proceeds by obtaining the expression for this condition.
From (15) and dV B = 0, we obtain, after using (8) and multiplying by 1− β,
0 = e1
(
y1
)
U ′
(
c1
(
y1
))
dc1
(
y1
)
+ e2
(
y1, y2
)
U ′
(
c2
(
y1, y2
))
dc2
(
y1, y2
)
(55)
+ up′ (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
))
dθ
− u (1− u)
p′ (θ)
p (θ)

U (b) + p (θ) ∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
)) dθ,
where the third line on the RHS uses
∂u (θ, s)
dθ
= −
sp′ (θ) (1− s)
[s+ p (θ) (1− s)]2
= −u (1− u)
p′ (θ)
p (θ)
, (56)
which follows from (9). Let us now express dc1 (y
1) and dc2 (y
1, y2) in (55) using dθ.
From (3) and dV u = 0, we have
0 = βp (θ) (1− s)π
(
y1
)
U ′
(
c1
(
y1
))
dc1
(
y1
)
+ β2p (θ) (1− s)2 π
(
y1, y2
)
U ′
(
c2
(
y1, y2
))
dc2
(
y1, y2
)
− βV up′ (θ) dθ
+ βp′ (θ)
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 (1− s)t−1

(1− s)∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
))
+ sV u

 dθ,
which, by multiplying by u and rearranging using (3) and (8), becomes
βe1
(
y1
)
U ′
(
c1
(
y1
))
dc1
(
y1
)
+ β2e2
(
y1, y2
)
U ′
(
c2
(
y1, y2
))
dc2
(
y1, y2
)
= −u
p′ (θ)
p (θ)
[(1− β)V u − U (b)] dθ. (57)
From (7) and d (ED) = 0, we have
0 = e1
(
y1
)
dc1
(
y1
)
+ e2
(
y1, y2
)
dc2
(
y1, y2
)
(58)
+ u

k − p′ (θ) ∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
) (
yt − ct
(
yt
)) dθ,
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which, using (13), becomes
dc1
(
y1
)
=
ku θq
′(θ)
q(θ)
e1 (y1)
dθ −
e2 (y
1, y2)
e1 (y1)
dc2
(
y1, y2
)
. (59)
From (57) and (59), we obtain
dc1
(
y1
)
= −u
β2U ′ (c2 (y
1, y2)) k
θq′(θ)
q(θ)
+ p
′(θ)
p(θ)
[(1− β)V u − U (b)]
βe1 (y1) (U ′ (c1 (y1))− βU ′ (c2 (y1, y2)))
dθ, (60)
dc2
(
y1, y2
)
= u
βU ′ (c1 (y
1)) k θq
′(θ)
q(θ)
+ p
′(θ)
p(θ)
[(1− β) V u − U (b)]
βe2 (y1, y2) (U ′ (c1 (y1))− βU ′ (c2 (y1, y2)))
dθ. (61)
Further, rewriting (14) as
V B = u

V u + p (θ) ∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
) (62)
and combining with (15) yields
p (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
))
= (1− β) V u − U (b) + (1− β) p (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
)
. (63)
Substituting (60) and (61) into (55) and using (63), we obtain
0 =
U ′ (c1 (y
1))U ′ (c2 (y
1, y2))
U ′ (c1 (y1))− βU ′ (c2 (y1, y2))
ku
θq′ (θ)
q (θ)
dθ (64)
+
1
1− β
u
(
1 +
1
β
U ′ (c2 (y
1, y2))− U
′ (c1 (y
1))
U ′ (c1 (y1))− βU ′ (c2 (y1, y2))
)
p′ (θ)
p (θ)
[(1− β) V u − U (b)] dθ
+ up′ (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
)
dθ
− u (1− u)
p′ (θ)
p (θ)

V u + p (θ) ∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
V et
(
yt
) dθ.
The participation constraint is slack at (y1, y2) by assumption, so (51) holds with c1 (y
1)
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and c2 (y
1, y2) replacing cτ (y
τ ) and cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1), respectively. Thus,
U ′ (c1 (y
1))U ′ (c2 (y
1, y2))
U ′ (c1 (y1))− βU ′ (c2 (y1, y2))
=
1
1
U ′(c2(y1,y2))
− β
U ′(c1(y1))
= α−1, (65)
U ′ (c2 (y
1, y2))− U
′ (c1 (y
1))
U ′ (c1 (y1))− βU ′ (c2 (y1, y2))
=
1
U ′(c1(y1))
− 1
U ′(c2(y1,y2))
1
U ′(c2(y1,y2))
− β
U ′(c1(y1))
=
1− β
αU ′ (c1 (y1))
− 1. (66)
Substituting (65) and (66) into (64), setting c1 (y
1) = c¯1, noting (2), and rearranging
terms yields (52).
Lemma A7 links c¯1 with the direct marginal cost of V
u.
Lemma A7 Let γ > 0 be the direct marginal cost of V u for the Benthamite planner.
Then, (i) γ = (1/U ′ (c¯1)− α) /β, (ii) γ ≤ α/ (1− β), with strict inequality if there is any
binding participation constraint.
Proof. Let x be the Benthamite efficient allocation, and let γ > 0 be the direct marginal
cost of V u for the Benthamite planner. To prove (i), take any y1 at which the partici-
pation constraint is slack, and perturb x by dV e1 (y
1) 6= 0 while keeping V u unchanged.
Since the direct marginal cost of V e1 (y
1) is λ1 (y
1), the planner’s cost of providing V e1 (y
1)
to measure e1 (y
1) of workers with history y1 rises by e1 (y
1) λ1 (y
1) dV e1 (y
1). As observed
from (14), however, the perturbation directly raises V B by e1 (y
1) dV e1 (y
1), whose value
in resource units is αe1 (y
1) dV e1 (y
1). Also, as observed from (2), the rise in V e1 (y
1)
increases, taking V u in future periods as given, V u by βp (θ) (1− s)π1 (y
1) dV e1 (y
1);
hence, the cost of providing the same V u as before to measure u of agents falls by
γuβp (θ) (1− s)π1 (y
1) dV e1 (y
1) = γβe1 (y
1) dV e1 (y
1). Since the participation constraint
is slack at y1, both positive and negative dV e1 (y
1) are consistent with incentive feasibility;
thus, net gains from such a perturbation must be zero, or
e1
(
y1
)
λ1
(
y1
)
dV e1
(
y1
)
= αe1
(
y1
)
dV e1
(
y1
)
+ γβe1
(
y1
)
dV e1
(
y1
)
. (67)
Dividing by dV e1 (y
1) and noting λ1 (y
1) = 1/U ′ (c¯1) yields γ = (1/U
′ (c¯1)− α) /β.
To prove (ii), again take any y1 at which the participation constraint is slack, and per-
turb x by (dc1 (y
1) , dc2 (y
1, y2)), where the perturbation sustains ED = 0 and dc2 (y
1, y2) >
0. From (7) and d (ED) = 0, we have
dc1
(
y1
)
= −
e2 (y
1, y2)
e1 (y1)
dc2
(
y1, y2
)
= − (1− s)
π (y1, y2)
π (y1)
dc2
(
y1, y2
)
. (68)
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To see that the perturbed allocation is incentive feasible, note from (25) that the
perturbation raises V u by
dV u
=
p (θ)
(1− β)
[
1 + βp(θ)(1−s)
1−β+βs
]β (1− s) π (y1)U ′ (c1 (y1)) dc1 (y1)
+
p (θ)
(1− β)
[
1 + βp(θ)(1−s)
1−β+βs
]β2 (1− s)2 π (y1, y2)U ′ (c2 (y1, y2)) dc2 (y1, y2)
= −
p (θ)
(1− β)
[
1 + βp(θ)(1−s)
1−β+βs
]β (1− s)2 π (y1, y2) (U ′ (c1 (y1))− βU ′ (c2 (y1, y2))) dc2 (y1, y2) ,
where the second equality uses (68). Since U ′ (c1 (y
1)) > βU ′ (c2 (y
1, y2)) from Lemmas
A4 and A6, and since dc2 (y
1, y2) > 0 by assumption, dV
u < 0. Further, (5) implies that
for all yt except this particular y1, V et (y
t) falls by βs/ (1− β + βs) < 1 times the fall in
V u; thus, V et (y
t) falls by less than V o, so the participation constraint still holds. The
participation constraint also holds at (y1, y2), at which current consumption is increased.
Finally, the participation constraint is initially slack at y1, so it remains thus for an
infinitesimal perturbation.
Thus, the perturbed allocation is feasible since it sustains ED = 0 and is incentive
feasible. Therefore, the efficiency of x requires the change in V B to be such that dV B ≤ 0.
From (35) and (68), we obtain
dV B =
1
1− β
(
e1
(
y1
)
U ′
(
c1
(
y1
))
dc1
(
y1
)
+ e2
(
y1, y2
)
U ′
(
c2
(
y1, y2
))
dc2
(
y1, y2
))
= −
1
1 − β
e2
(
y1, y2
) (
U ′
(
c1
(
y1
))
− U ′
(
c2
(
y1, y2
)))
dc2
(
y1, y2
)
. (69)
Since dV B ≤ 0 and dc2 (y
1, y2) > 0, we have U
′ (c1 (y
1)) ≥ U ′ (c2 (y
1, y2)). In particular, if
we take (y1, y2) at which the participation constraint is slack, (51) holds with c1 (y
1) = c¯1
and c2 (y
1, y2) replacing cτ (y
τ ) and cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1), respectively. Therefore,
α + β
1
U ′ (c1 (y1))
=
1
U ′ (c2 (y1, y2))
≥
1
U ′ (c1 (y1))
, (70)
hence 1/U ′ (c1 (y
1)) = 1/U ′ (c¯1) ≤ α/ (1− β), and thus γ = (1/U
′ (c¯1)− α) /β ≤ α/ (1− β).
Finally, suppose the participation constraint binds at some yt. Then, if dV B = 0, the
perturbation sustains ED = 0 and keeps V B unchanged, while lowering V u and thus V o.
The resulting relaxation of the participation constraint enables achieving a greater value
31
of V B; this contradicts the fact that x is the Benthamite efficient allocation, so dV B < 0.
Thus, U ′ (c1 (y
1)) > U ′ (c2 (y
1, y2)), such that the inequality in (70) becomes strict; hence,
γ < α/ (1− β).
Lemma A8 Let ψt (y
t) be as defined by (21) and (22). Then, ψt (y
t) equals the shadow
cost of the participation constraint at yt for the Benthamite planner.
Proof. Note from (21) that ψt+1 (y
t, yt+1) is positive if the participation constraint binds
at yt and zero otherwise. Now, if the participation constraint at (yt, yt+1) is slack, its
shadow cost is zero. If it binds, its shadow cost is 1/U ′
(
cb (yt+1)
)
− (α + βλt (y
t)).
To see this, note that as the binding participation constraint at (yt, yt+1) is tightened
by one infinitesimal unit, V et+1 (y
t, yt+1) must be increased by one infinitesimal unit.
Thus, the shadow cost rises one to one with 1/U ′
(
cb (yt+1)
)
, the direct marginal cost
of V et+1 (y
t, yt+1) = V
o (yt+1), and vanishes as α + βλt (y
t) approaches 1/U ′
(
cb (yt+1)
)
,
where the participation constraint turns slack. This proves the claim for ψt+1 (y
t, yt+1),
and a similar argument proves the claim for ψ1 (y
1).
We now prove the existence of the Benthamite efficient allocation by invoking the
Weierstrass theorem. Given the aggregate resource constraint, supx∈D′ V
B is clearly
finite, while it is not immediate that maxx∈D′ V
B is well defined. The challenge here lies
in showing the compactness of the set of feasible allocations, which is infinite dimensional.
We achieve this by using the consumption rule above to restrict attention to a subset of
feasible allocations, which is shown to have a homeomorphism to a finite-dimensional set.
Lemma A9 The Benthamite efficient allocation exists.
Proof. Let D
′′
⊂ D
′
be the set of feasible allocations x = (θ, {ct (y
t)}
∞
t=1) such that,
for some cˆ1 ∈ C ≡ [c
∗, c¯∗] ⊂ (0,∞), c (y¯n) ∈ C, n = 1, 2, . . . , N , and αˆ ∈ [α
∗, α¯∗], (i)
θ ∈
[
θ, θ¯
]
⊂ (0,∞), (ii) c1 (y
1) = max {cˆ1, c (y1)} for all y
1 = y1, and (iii) ct+1 (y
t, yt+1) =
max
{
(U ′)−1
(
1
αˆ+β/U ′(ct(yt))
)
, c (yt+1)
}
for all (yt, yt+1). Here, θ (θ¯) is a sufficiently small
(large) constant such that the Benthamite planner never optimally chooses θ < θ (θ > θ¯)
and similarly for c∗ (c¯∗), while α∗ ≡ 1/U ′ (c∗)− β/U ′ (c¯∗) and α¯∗ ≡ (1− β) /U ′ (c¯∗).29
In words, D′′ is a set of feasible allocations with consumption rules that are compatible
with those described in Lemmas A4–A6. Thus, if the Benthamite efficient allocation
29The restriction αˆ ≥ α∗ does not bind because, for any αˆ < α∗ and ct (y
t) ≤ c¯∗, we have
(U ′)
−1
(
1
αˆ+β/U ′(ct(yt))
)
≤ c∗ ≤ c (yt+1) and thus ct+1 (y
t, yt+1) = c (yt+1), just as for αˆ = α
∗. In
contrast, αˆ ≤ α¯∗ implies that if ct (y
t) ≤ c¯∗, then (U ′)−1
(
1
αˆ+β/U ′(ct(yt))
)
≤ c¯∗ and thus ensures that
consumption never exceeds c¯∗; this is also not a binding restriction if c¯∗ is set sufficiently large.
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exists, it must belong to D′′. Importantly, despite being infinite dimensional, allocations
in D′′ can be characterized by a finite number of variables,
(
θ, cˆ1, αˆ, {c (y¯n)}
N
n=1
)
. To see
that D′′ is nonempty, consider allocations in which ct (y
t) = b for all yt. Such allocations
satisfy conditions (ii) and (iii) above for cˆ1 = b, c (y¯n) = b, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and αˆ =
(1− β) /U ′ (b), and are incentive feasible since they yield V et (y
t) = V u = U (b) / (1− β)
for any yt. Further, given y¯n > b for all y¯n ∈ Y , such allocations with sufficiently small
θ satisfy (11) and are thus also resource feasible; hence, D′′ is nonempty.
Below, we first prove that V B attains its maximum in D′′ by establishing the com-
pactness of (D′′, dD′′). For any c ∈ C, let G (c) ≡ 1/U
′ (c) and g (c) ≡ G′ (c). Further,
let g ≡ minc∈C g (c) and g¯ ≡ maxc∈C g (c). Clearly, 0 < g < g¯ < ∞. Then, for any
c, c′ ∈ C, the intermediate value theorem implies
G (c)−G (c′) = g
(
cλ
)
(c− c′) (71)
for some cλ between c and c′, and thus
g |c− c′| ≤ |G (c)−G (c′)| ≤ g¯ |c− c′| . (72)
Now, define f : D′′ → RN+3 by f (x) =
(
θ, cˆ1, αˆ, {c (y¯n)}
N
n=1
)
for x ∈ D′′, where,
for any x ∈ D′′ in which consumption is constant at some c, c (y¯n) ≡ c for all n ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N}.30 Further, let D˜′′ ≡ f (D′′) ⊂ RN+3. Now, define dD′′ : D
′′ ×D′′ → R+ by
dD′′ (x, x
′) = max
{
|θ − θ′| , sup
yt
∥∥ct (yt)− c′t (yt)∥∥
}
(73)
for x and x′ in D′′, and dD˜′′ : D˜
′′ × D˜′′ →R+ by
dD˜′′ (z, z
′) = max
{
|θ − θ′| , |cˆ1 − cˆ
′
1| , [(1− β) g¯]
−1 |αˆ− αˆ′| , max
n∈{1,2,...,N}
|c (y¯n)− c
′ (y¯n)|
}
(74)
for z =
(
θ, cˆ1, αˆ, {c (y¯n)}
N
n=1
)
and z′ =
(
θ′, cˆ′1, αˆ
′, {c′ (y¯n)}
N
n=1
)
in D˜′′. Then, dD′′ and dD˜′′
are distance functions in D′′ and D˜′′, respectively.
Clearly, f is a continuous function from a metric space (D′′, dD′′) to
(
D˜′′, dD˜′′
)
; further,
f is a bijection between D′′ to D˜′′, so f−1 exists. As shown below, f−1 is also a continuous
30For x ∈ D′′ in which consumption is constant at some c, {c (y¯n)}
N
n=1 is not uniquely identified from
condition (iii) above, since any {c (y¯n)}
N
n=1 with c (y¯n) ≤ c, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, is consistent with (iii).
The assumption here on {c (y¯n)}
N
n=1 is made simply to ensure that f is a function, not a correspondence,
even in such a case.
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function from
(
D˜′′, dD˜′′
)
to (D′′, dD′′). Take any ǫ > 0. Then, take z, z
′ ∈ D˜′′ such that
dD˜′′ (z, z
′) < δ ≡
(
g/g¯
)
ǫ, which implies |θ − θ′| < δ, |cˆ1 − cˆ
′
1| < δ, |αˆ− αˆ
′| < (1− β) g¯δ,
and |c (y¯n)− c
′ (y¯n)| < δ, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. The last inequality and (72) then imply
|G (c (y¯n))−G (c
′ (y¯n))| < g¯δ, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} . (75)
Now, let x ≡ f−1 (z) and x′ ≡ f−1 (z′). Since |θ − θ′| < δ < ǫ, if we can show
|ct (y
t)− c′t (y
t)| < ǫ for all yt, then dD′′ (x, x
′) < ǫ and thus f−1 is continuous. We show
this by induction. First, for any y1,
c1
(
y1
)
− c′1
(
y1
)
= max {cˆ1, c (y1)} −max {cˆ
′
1, c
′ (y1)}
≤ max {cˆ1 − cˆ
′
1, c (y1)− c
′ (y1)}
< δ.
By symmetry, c′1 (y
1) − c1 (y
1) < δ, so |c1 (y
1)− c′1 (y
1)| < δ. Therefore, (72) implies
|G (c1 (y
1))−G (c′1 (y
1))| < g¯δ.
Next, take any yt, and suppose |G (ct (y
t))−G (c′t (y
t))| < g¯δ. Let
cˆt+1 ≡ (U
′)−1
(
1
αˆ+β/U ′(ct(yt))
)
and cˆ′t+1 ≡ (U
′)−1
(
1
αˆ′+β/U ′(c′
t
(yt))
)
. Then, ct+1 (y
t, yt+1) =
max {cˆt+1, c (yt+1)} and c
′
t+1 (y
t, yt+1) = max
{
cˆ′t+1, c
′ (yt+1)
}
for any yt+1 ∈ Y . Since
G is an increasing function, these expressions can be rewritten as G (ct+1 (y
t, yt+1)) =
max {G (cˆt+1) , G (c (yt+1))} and G
(
c′t+1 (y
t, yt+1)
)
= max
{
G
(
cˆ′t+1
)
, G (c′ (yt+1))
}
. Thus,
G
(
ct+1
(
yt, yt+1
))
−G
(
c′t+1
(
yt, yt+1
))
= max {G (cˆt+1) , G (c (yt+1))} −max
{
G
(
cˆ′t+1
)
, G (c′ (yt+1))
}
≤ max
{
G (cˆt+1)−G
(
cˆ′t+1
)
, G (c (yt+1)−G (c
′ (yt+1)))
}
< g¯δ.
Here, the last inequality follows since the definitions of cˆt+1 and cˆ
′
t+1 imply G (cˆt+1) = αˆ+
βG (ct (y
t)) and G
(
cˆ′t+1
)
= αˆ′ + βG (c′t (y
t)), which, combined with |αˆ− αˆ′| < (1− β) g¯δ
and |G (ct (y
t))−G (c′t (y
t))| ≤ g¯δ, yield
G (cˆt+1)−G
(
cˆ′t+1
)
= αˆ− αˆ′ + β
(
G
(
ct
(
yt
))
−G
(
c′t
(
yt
)))
< (1− β) g¯δ + βg¯δ = g¯δ,
while (75) implies |G (c (yt+1)−G (c
′ (yt+1)))| < g¯δ. By symmetry, G
(
c′t+1 (y
t, yt+1)
)
−
G (ct+1 (y
t, yt+1)) < g¯δ and thus
∣∣G (ct+1 (yt, yt+1))−G (c′t+1 (yt, yt+1))∣∣ < g¯δ.
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Therefore, by induction, |G (ct (y
t))−G (c′t (y
t))| < g¯δ for any yt. Combining this
result with the first inequality in (72) yields
∣∣ct (yt)− c′t (yt)∣∣ < g¯g δ = ǫ, ∀yt.
Thus, dD′′ (x, x
′) < ǫ for any z, z′ ∈ D˜′′ with dD˜′′ (z, z
′) < δ =
(
g/g¯
)
ǫ, so f−1 is continuous.
Now,
(
D˜′′, dD˜′′
)
is bounded by assumption and is also closed, as explained below.
Take any convergent sequence {xk}
∞
k=1 such that xk ∈ D
′′ for all k, and suppose x∞ /∈
D′′. Then, x∞ must violate at least one of the participation constraints or the resource
constraint, because as a limit of {xk}
∞
k=1, x∞ clearly satisfies conditions (i)–(iii) above.
However, since the expressions in these constraints are continuous functions from (D′′, dD′′)
to R,31 the constraint violated at x∞ must also be violated at xk for k sufficiently large.
This contradicts xk ∈ D
′′, so x∞ ∈ D
′′ and thus D′′ is closed. Then, since f−1 is
continuous, D˜′′ = f (D′′) is also closed. Therefore,
(
D˜′′, dD˜′′
)
is compact, because it is
closed and bounded and is a subset of RN+3 equipped with a metric corresponding to
dD˜′′. Then, (D
′′, dD′′) is also compact since f
−1 is continuous and D′′ = f−1
(
D˜′′
)
.32
Therefore, since V B is a continuous function from (D′′, dD′′) to R,
33 the Weierstrass
theorem implies that V B attains its maximum inD′′. It remains to show that maxx∈D′′ V
B =
supx∈D′ V
B, which in turn implies that maxx∈D′ V
B exists and equals maxx∈D′′ V
B. To
see this, suppose ε ≡
(
supx∈D′ V
B −maxx∈D′′ V
B
)
/2 > 0, and let εm ≡ ε/ (m+ 1),
m = 1, 2, . . .. From the definition of the supremum, for each m, there exists some
xm ∈ D
′ that provides the value of V B, denoted as V Bm , with V
B
m > supx∈D′ V
B − εm.
In fact, xm ∈ D
′/D′′, since V Bm > maxx∈D′′ V
B by construction. Now, for any alloca-
tion in D′/D′′, the Benthamite planner can provide the same V B with fewer resources
by resorting to the perturbations discussed in the proof of Lemmas A4 and A6. As m
increases and εm approaches zero, such resources savings from perturbations must also
approach zero, because otherwise the planner could use those saved resources to increase
V Bm by more than εm and thus provide V
B that exceeds supx∈D′ V
B. This requires, for
sufficiently large m, that xm become arbitrarily close to some xˆm ∈ D
′′. The continuity
of V B then implies that, for sufficiently large m, V Bm must also become arbitrarily close
to Vˆ Bm , the value of V
B achieved by xˆm. In particular, Vˆ
B
m > V
B
m − ε, hence combined
31To elaborate, the expressions in these constraints are clearly continuous functions from (D, dD) to
R. Also, since D′′ ⊆ D and dD′′ (x, x
′) = dD (x, x
′) for all x, x′ ∈ D′′, (D′′, dD′′) is a metric subspace of
(D, dD) (and, viewed as a topological space, (D
′′, dD′′) is a topological subspace of (D, dD)). Thus, the
restrictions of these expressions to (D′′, dD′′) are also continuous (see Munkres (2000), Theorem 18.2(d)).
32Note that the preimage of a continuous function on a closed set is closed, and the image of a continuous
function of a compact set is compact (see Rudin (1976), Corollary to Theorem 4.8, and Theorem 4.14).
33The argument is similar to that in footnote 31.
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with V Bm > supx∈D′ V
B − εm and ε > εm, we have
Vˆ Bm > sup
x∈D′
V B − (εm + ε) > sup
x∈D′
V B − 2ε = max
x∈D′′
V B, (76)
which is a contradiction since xˆm ∈ D
′′. Therefore, ε = 0 and thus maxx∈D′′ V
B =
maxx∈D′ V
B = supx∈D′ V
B, and the maximizer of V B in D′′, whose existence is proved
above, is the Benthamite efficient allocation.
Proposition 1 is proved by combining the results above. Let x be the Benthamite
efficient allocation. To show (17), take any yt and (yt, yt+1). If the participation con-
straint is slack at (yt, yt+1), then Lemma A4 and (16) imply λt+1 (y
t, yt+1) = α+ βλt (y
t).
If the participation constraint binds at (yt, yt+1), then ct+1 (y
t, yt+1) = c
b (yt+1), hence
λt+1 (y
t, yt+1) = 1/U
′
(
cb (yt+1)
)
. Combining these results with Lemma A6 and noting
(21) yields (17). Similarly, combining Lemmas A6 and A7 and noting (22) yields (18).
Next, (19) follows from (52) by noting γ = (1/U ′ (c¯1)− α) /β from Lemma A7.
To obtain (20), perturb x by dV u 6= 0 while keeping V et (y
t) unchanged for all yt.
From (2), note that the change in V u from a given change in some V e1 (y
1), which
takes into account the effect of the change in V u in future periods on the current V u,
is 1/ [(1− β) + βp (θ) (1− s)] times that when the values of V u in future periods are
taken as given. Accordingly, the increase in the planner’s cost of providing V u to a
measure u of unemployed workers, which takes into account the effect of the change in
V u in future periods, is uγ [1− β + βp (θ) (1− s)] dV u. On the other hand, the increase
in V u by dV u directly raises V B by udV u, whose value in terms of resources is αudV u.
Further, as seen from (4), the increase in V u raises each V et (y
t) by βsdV u; thus, the cost
of providing the same V et (y
t) as before to a measure et (y
t) of workers with history yt falls
by et (y
t)βsλt (y
t) dV u. Finally, the increase in V u tightens the participation constraint
at each yt by dV u, whose cost is et (y
t)ψt (y
t) dV u. Since dV u can be made positive or
negative, the efficiency of x requires the net gain from such a perturbation to be zero, or
uγ [1− β + βp (θ) (1− s)] dV u = αudV u+
∞∑
t=1
∑
yt
et
(
yt
) (
βsλt
(
yt
)
− ψt
(
yt
))
dV u. (77)
Dividing (77) by dV u yields (20).
Finally, that α, λt (y
t), γ, and ψt (y
t) have the properties described in Proposition 1
is shown in Lemmas A4, A5, A7, and A8. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
To prove (i), note from Lemma A6 that for all y1 at which the participation constraint
is slack, c1 (y
1) = c¯1 for some c¯1. Moreover, by assumption, the participation constraint
binds at some yt, so, from Lemma A7, γ < α/ (1− β). Therefore, λ1 (y
1) = α + βγ <
α/ (1− β) = 1/U ′ (c∞) and thus c¯1 < c∞.
To prove (ii), suppose the participation constraint is slack at (yτ , yτ+1). From Lemma
A4, (51) holds and thus noting 1/U ′ (c∞) = α/ (1− β), it follows that if cτ (y
τ) < c∞, then
cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) ∈ (cτ (y
τ) , c∞) whereas if cτ (y
τ) > c∞, then cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) ∈ (c∞, cτ (y
τ)).
To prove (iii), combine (17) and (18) to obtain
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
λt
(
yt
)
=
1
1− β (1− s)

1− s
s
α + (1− s) γβ +
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
ψt
(
yt
) . (78)
Substituting (78) into (20) yields
uγ +
∞∑
t=1
∑
yt
et
(
yt
)
λt
(
yt
)
=
α
1− β
. (79)
Since γ < α/ (1− β) and u +
∑∞
t=1
∑
yt et (y
t) = 1, (79) requires λt (y
t) > α/ (1− β)
and thus ct (y
t) > c∞ for some y
t. From (i) and (ii), however, until the participation
constraint binds for the first time, ct (y
t) < c∞ and thus λt (y
t) < 1/U ′ (c∞) = α/ (1− β).
Therefore, there must be at least one state y¯n ∈ Y for which a binding participation
constraint raises consumption above c∞, or c
b (y¯n) > c∞. 
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is simpler than for Proposition 1 because, given V R = V u, we have one
fewer variable for which to examine the effect of a given perturbation. The proof proceeds
through Lemmas A10–A15, which parallel Lemmas A4–A9.
Lemma A10 In the Rawlsian efficient allocation, U ′ (cτ (y
τ )) = βU ′ (cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)) for
any history yτ and (yτ , yτ+1) such that the participation constraint is slack at (y
τ , yτ+1).
Proof. Let x be the Rawlsian efficient allocation. Take any (yτ , yτ+1), and perturb x
by (dcτ (y
τ ) , dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)), keeping V
u unchanged. If the participation constraint is
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initially slack at (yτ , yτ+1), then from Lemma A3, the perturbed allocation is incentive
feasible. Then, the perturbation above must sustain ED = 0. This is because if
ED < 0, the perturbed allocation is feasible and achieves the same V R = V u as x; hence,
it is also a Rawlsian efficient allocation, contradicting Lemma A2. If ED > 0, a similar
contradiction follows by perturbing x by (−dcτ (y
τ ) ,−dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)). From (7),
d (ED) = eτ (y
τ) dcτ (y
τ) + eτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) , (80)
so letting d (ED) = 0 and using (47) and eτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) = eτ (y
τ) (1− s) π (yτ , yτ+1) /π (y
τ),
(
1− β
U ′ (cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1))
U ′ (cτ (yτ))
)
eτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) dcτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1) = 0. (81)
Therefore, U ′ (cτ (y
τ)) = βU ′ (cτ+1 (y
τ , yτ+1)), as was to be shown.
Lemma A11 The direct marginal cost of V et (y
t) for the Rawlsian planner is increasing
in V et (y
t) and equals λt (y
t) = 1/U ′ (ct (y
t)).
Proof. The proof follows by proceeding as in Lemma A5, and noting from Lemma A10
that the consumption profile chosen by the Rawlsian planner to provide V et (y
t), given V u,
will also be chosen by the relevant component planner who faces Rt (y
t) = 1 for all yt.
Lemma A12 In the Rawlsian efficient allocation, the conclusions of Lemma A6 hold,
with c¯1 replaced by some c˜1 and (52) replaced by
−ku
θq′ (θ)
q (θ)
= u
1
βU ′ (c˜1)
βp′ (θ) (1− s)

∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
V e1
(
y1
)
− V u

 . (82)
Proof. That consumption is greater under a binding participation constraint follows by
arguing as in the proof of Lemma A6 and noting Lemma A11.
That consumption equals c˜1 for all y
1 at which the participation constraint is slack
also follows from a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma A6.
To prove that c˜1 satisfies (82), let x be the Rawlsian efficient allocation. Take any
y1 such that the participation constraint is slack, and perturb x by (dθ, dc1 (y
1)), keeping
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V u unchanged. From (3),
0 = dV u
= βp′ (θ)
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 (1− s)t−1

(1− s)∑
yt
π
(
yt
)
U
(
ct
(
yt
))
+ sV u

 dθ (83)
+ βp (θ) (1− s)π
(
y1
)
U ′
(
c1
(
y1
))
dc1
(
y1
)
− βV up′ (θ) dθ,
so using (3) and cancelling out terms,
βp (θ) (1− s)π
(
y1
)
U ′
(
c1
(
y1
))
dc1
(
y1
)
= −
p′ (θ)
p (θ)
[(1− β)V u − U (b)] dθ. (84)
Since V u is unchanged in the perturbed allocation, neither is V o (yt) for any yt ∈ Y .
From (5), for all yt except this y1, clearly V et (y
t) is unchanged, so the participation
constraint still holds. On the other hand, V e1 (y
1) rises by U ′ (c1 (y
1)) dc1 (y
1), which is
negative if dc1 (y
1)< 0; however, since the participation constraint is initially slack at y1,
it remains thus for an infinitesimal dc1 (y
1).
Then, from a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma A10, the perturbation above
must sustain ED = 0. From (7),
d (ED) = u

k − p′ (θ) ∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t
∑
yt
π
(
yt
) (
yt − ct
(
yt
)) dθ + e (y1) dc1 (y1)
= −u
θq′ (θ)
q (θ)
kdθ − u
1
βU ′ (c1 (y1))
βp′ (θ) (1− s)

∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
V e1
(
y1
)
− V u

 dθ,
where the second equality uses (2), (13), and (84). Imposing d (ED) = 0 and setting
c1 (y
1) = c˜1 yields (82).
Lemma A13 Let γ > 0 be the direct marginal cost of V u for the Rawlsian planner.
Then, γ = 1/ (βU ′ (c˜1)).
Proof. The proof follows by proceeding as in the proof of Lemma A7(i) and noting that,
since an increase in V et (y
t) has no direct impact on V R = V u, (67) is replaced by
e1
(
y1
)
λ1
(
y1
)
dV e1
(
y1
)
= γβe1
(
y1
)
dV e1
(
y1
)
. (85)
Dividing by dV e1 (y
1) and noting λ1 (y
1) = 1/U ′ (c˜1) yields γ = 1/ (βU
′ (c˜1)).
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Lemma A14 Let ψt (y
t) be as defined by (29) and (30). Then, ψt (y
t) equals the shadow
cost of the participation constraint at yt for the Rawlsian planner.
Proof. The proof follows by replacing (21) with (29) and α + βλt (y
t) with βλt (y
t) in
the proof of Proposition A8.
Lemma A15 The Rawlsian efficient allocation exists.
Proof. The proof follows from a similar argument as for Lemma A9, with αˆ set to 0.
Proposition 3 is proved by combining the results above. Let x be the Rawlsian efficient
allocation. Take any yt and (yt, yt+1). If the participation constraint is slack at (y
t, yt+1),
then Lemma A10 and (16) imply λt+1 (y
t, yτ+1) = βλt (y
t). If the participation constraint
binds at (yt, yt+1), then ct+1 (y
t, yτ+1) = c
b (yt+1), hence λt+1 (y
t, yτ+1) = 1/U
′
(
cb (yt+1)
)
.
Combining these results with Lemma A12 and noting (29) yields (26). Similarly, com-
bining Lemmas A12 and A13 and noting (30) yields (27).
Next, (28) follows from (82) by noting γ = 1/ (βU ′ (c˜1)) from Lemma A13.
Finally, that λt (y
t), γ, and ψt (y
t) have the properties described in Proposition 3 is
shown in Lemmas A11, A13, and A14. 
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows immediately from Lemmas A10 and A12. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Assume the market economy described in the main text. Let (V u, θ) be as in the
Rawlsian efficient allocation, and let R = 1. We proceed in three steps and show that
the Rawlsian efficient allocation is consistent with market equilibrium.
Step 1 is to show that if, for all y1, the values of V1 (y
1) in the market economy coincide
with those in the Rawlsian efficient allocation, then so will the consumption profile. This
is seen by noting that the optimal contracting problem of the financial intermediary where
R = 1 is equivalent to the problem of the component planner in Lemma A1 where Rt (y
t) =
1 for all yt. Thus, from the argument in the proof of Lemma A11, if financial intermedi-
aries are to provide the same V1 (y
1) as in the Rawlsian efficient allocation, they will choose
the same consumption profile as the Rawlsian planner does. This completes Step 1.
Step 2 is to show that if V¯ e1 , the worker’s expected value of being newly employed be-
fore observing y1, in the market economy equals the corresponding value in the Rawlsian
efficient allocation, then so does V1 (y
1) for all y1. To see this, let Π (Vt (y
t) ; yt) be the
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expected continuation profit for the financial intermediary in a match with the current
promised utility Vt (y
t) and history yt. From the argument in Step 1, Π (Vt (y
t) ; yt) =
Φ (yt) − Q (Vt (y
t) ; yt), where Φ (yt), the expected output from the match, is exoge-
nously given, and Q is the component planner’s cost function. Thus, from Lemma
A1, Π (Vt (y
t) ; yt) is decreasing, strictly concave, and Π′ (Vt (y
t) ; yt) = −1/U ′ (ct (y
t)).
Now, note that given any V¯ e1 , the financial intermediary’s expected profit from a new
match before observing y1 is given by
Π¯
(
V¯ e1
)
= max
{V1(y1)}
∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
Π
(
V1
(
y1
)
; y1
)
(86)
s.t.
∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
V1
(
y1
)
≥ V¯ e1 , (87)
V1
(
y1
)
≥ V o (y1) , ∀y
1 = y1 ∈ Y. (88)
The first-order and envelope conditions imply Π¯′
(
V¯ e1
)
= Π′ (V1 (y
1) ; y1) = −1/U ′ (c1 (y
1))
for any y1 at which the participation constraint (88) is slack, hence V1 (y
1) leads to the
same consumption across such y1, while V1 (y
1) = V o (y1) for y
1 at which (88) binds. If
V¯ e1 is set to the value in the Rawlsian efficient allocation, such choices of V1 (y
1) clearly co-
incide with those of the Rawlsian planner in Propositions 3 and 4. This completes Step 2.
Step 3 is to show that the Rawlsian efficient allocation is consistent with the three
equilibrium conditions. First, the Nash bargaining problem is given by
max
V¯ e
1
(
V¯ e1 − V
u
)η (
Π¯
(
V¯ e1
))1−η
s.t. V¯ e1 ≥ V
u, Π¯
(
V¯ e1
)
≥ 0, (89)
hence taking the first-order condition yields the Nash bargaining condition,
η
1− η
Π¯
(
V¯ e1
)
= −Π¯′
(
V¯ e1
) (
V¯ e1 − V
u
)
. (90)
Second, given R = 1, the zero-profit condition for posting a vacancy is given by34
k = q (θ) (1− s) Π¯
(
V¯ e1
)
. (91)
Third, the consumption loan market clearing condition is such that the demand for loans
34For a general R, the zero-profit condition for posting a vacancy is expressed as k =
(1/R) q (θ) (1− s) Π¯
(
V¯ e1
)
= q (θ)
∑∞
t=1 [(1− s) /R]
t∑
yt pi (y
t) (yt − ct (y
t)). Note that this condition
coincides with the consumption loan market clearing condition below if and only if R = 1.
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to finance the vacancy cost, kv, equals the supply of loans from existing matches, or
kv =
∞∑
t=1
∑
yt
et
(
yt
) (
yt − ct
(
yt
))
. (92)
Henceforth, let V¯ e1 be as in the Rawlsian efficient allocation. Given R = 1, the results
in Steps 1 and 2 imply
Π¯
(
V¯ e1
)
=
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t−1
∑
yt
π
(
yt
) (
yt − ct
(
yt
))
, (93)
V¯ e1 =
∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
V e1
(
y1
)
, (94)
where {ct (y
t)}
∞
t=1 and V
e
1 (y
1) are as in the Rawlsian efficient allocation, and
Π¯′
(
V¯ e1
)
= −
1
U ′ (c˜1)
= −βγ, (95)
where c˜1 and γ are as defined in Lemmas A12 and A13. Further, since η = −θq
′ (θ) /q (θ)
by assumption and since p (θ) = θq (θ) implies p′ (θ) = q (θ) + θq′ (θ),
η
1− η
= −
θq′ (θ)
q (θ) + θq′ (θ)
= −
θq′ (θ)
p′ (θ)
. (96)
Using (93)–(96), we can rewrite the Nash bargaining condition (90) as
−
θq′ (θ)
p′ (θ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− s)t−1
∑
yt
π
(
yt
) (
yt − ct
(
yt
))
= βγ

∑
y1
π
(
y1
)
V e1
(
y1
)
− V u

 . (97)
Since the Rawlsian efficient allocation satisfies (12) and (28), it satisfies (97) and is thus
consistent with the Nash bargaining condition. Further, substituting for Π¯
(
V¯ e1
)
in (91)
from (93) and noting v = θu in (92) reveals that both the zero-profit and the market
clearing conditions are implied by (12) and are thus satisfied by the Rawlsian efficient
allocation. This concludes Step 3.
Steps 1 to 3 establish that the Rawlsian efficient allocation is supported as a market
equilibrium in which R = 1. 
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